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NOTE
BENNETT V. SPEAR: A NEW INTERPRETATION OF
THE CITIZEN-SUIT PROVISION
I. INTRODUCTION
As society becomes more populated and complex with the
passing of each day, more and more stress is created. There is
conflict between individual citizens and the laws set out by our
government, as evidenced by the dockets in the criminal courts
across the country. There are also conflicts between individual
citizens themselves, as evidenced by the dockets in the civil courts
across the country. One of the sources of this conflict is the ever
increasing pressure that we are placing on our environment. In
the 1970's our government recognized the need to try to preserve
our environment and began to implement a number of legislative
acts targeted at reducing the pressures that the business and pri-
vate sectors were placing on the environment.'
One such legislative act was the Endangered Species Act of
1973 (ESA).2 The ESA was enacted by Congress as a result of the
pressures and stresses that were being placed on the environ-
ment. The act was drafted in order to provide a means whereby
the ecosystems upon which endangered 3 and threatened species4
depend would be conserved, to provide a program by which these
species would be preserved and to take appropriate steps to imple-
1. See Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449, 42
U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1994).
2. 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 88 1531-1544 (1994)).
3. The term "endangered species" means any species which is in danger of
extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range other than a species
of the Class Insecta determined by the Secretary to constitute a pest whose
protection under the provision of this chapter would present an overwhelming
and overriding risk to man. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6).
4. The term "threatened species" means any species which is likely to
become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a
significant portion of its range. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).
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ment international treaties and conventions for the conservation
of threatened and endangered species.5
The Endangered Species Act was the predominate legislation
that gave rise to Bennett v. Spear.6 This case arose as a result of
a conflict in Oregon between ranch operators, certain irrigation
districts, the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Bureau of Recla-
mation.' The root of the conflict was the Klamath Irrigation Pro-
ject and the determination that such project might affect two
endangered species.' The petitioners, irrigation districts that
depended on water from the Klamath Project and operators of
ranches in those districts, brought suit under section 1540(g)(1) of
the ESA claiming that the jeopardy determination of the two
endangered species and the imposition of a minimum water level
requirement violated certain sections of the ESA.9 This suit was
unprecedented in that the petitioners were seeking relief under
the "citizen-suit" provision of the ESA, not in an effort to protect
an endangered species or a critical habitat, but rather to challenge
the overprotection of such species that would have a detrimental
effect on the petitioners.
This Note examines the effect the Supreme Court's decision in
Bennett v. Spear will have when the analysis used is applied to
other environmental acts that include citizen-suit provisions. In
particular, this Note will address how this decision might affect
the protection of wetlands under the Clean Water Act.10 First,
this Note will provide a review of the decision in Bennett v. Spear.
Second, this Note will discuss the significance of wetlands and the
Clean Water Act. Next, this Note will explain the history of the
citizen-suit provision that is a part of so many environmental acts.
This Note will also examine the actual language of the citizen-suit
provisions of the ESA and the Clean Water Act and how the lan-
guage of these acts might be interpreted in a similar manner. The
Note concludes that, although legally sound, the Supreme Court's
decision in Bennett v. Spear compromises the very reason that the
ESA, the Clean Water Act, and other environmental acts were
drafted: to protect and preserve the environment.
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
6. Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
7. Id. at 1157.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
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II. BENNET v. SPEAR - THE CASE
The petitioners, irrigation districts receiving water from the
Klamath Irrigation Project and operators of ranches in those dis-
tricts, filed this action in the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon under the citizen-suit provision" of the Endan-
gered Species Act alleging violations of the Act concerning the pro-
posed use of reservoir water to protect two endangered species. 12
The case was dismissed by Chief Judge, Michael R. Hogan and
appeal was taken.' 3 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the trial judge's dismissal of the case.' 4 Certiorari was
granted and the Supreme Court held that the: (1) zone-of-interests
test of prudential standing did not preclude ranchers and irriga-
tion districts from bringing claims under citizen-suit provision of
ESA expressly allowing any person to bring civil action to enforce
ESA; (2) rancher and irrigation districts alleged sufficient injury
in fact, and that their injury from reduced water for irrigation was
fairly traceable to Fish and Wildlife Service's biological opinion,
for purposes of establishing Article III standing; (3) claim alleging
that Secretary of Interior failed to consider economic impact of
critical habitat designation was reviewable under citizen-suit pro-
vision of ESA; and (4) claim that biological opinion failed to com-
ply with ESA's requirement for use of best scientific and
commercial data available was reviewable under Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). '
The petitioners brought the suit to challenge the biological
opinion that was issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service, in
accordance with the ESA, in regards to the Klamath Irrigation
Project and the project's potential impact on two species of endan-
gered fish.16 The issue before the court was one of first impression
as no party had before attempted to use a citizen-suit provision in
order to challenge the overprotection of the environment to the
detriment of that party. Before the decision in this case, only indi-
vidual citizens and environmental groups had used these citizen-
suit provisions in an attempt to protect or preserve the environ-
11. See infra Section IV for discussion of the history of citizen-suit provisions.
12. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1154.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1158 (The biological opinion was issued in accordance with the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).).
1997]
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ment or a particular species. The issue before the Bennett Court
was whether the petitioners, who had economic and other inter-
ests affected by the biological opinion, had standing to seek judi-
cial review of the biological opinion under the citizen-suit
provision of the ESA 17 and the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).' 8
A. ESA Background
In order to understand the case it will be necessary to first
examine the basic procedures required by the ESA when a partic-
ular project could possibly affect an "endangered" or "threatened"
species. Under the ESA, the Secretary of Interior has the duty to
list all species of animals that are "threatened" or "endangered"'9
and to designate their "critical habitat."20 If any agency deter-
mines the action it proposes to take may adversely affect a listed
species, it must formally engage the Fish and Wildlife Service
(hereinafter referred to as "Service") for consultation.2' The Ser-
vice must provide the agency with a written statement called a
Biological Opinion which explains how the proposed action might
affect the species or habitat.22 If the Service determines that the
project could "jeopardize the continued existence of any species or
result in the destruction of [critical habitat],"23 then the Opinion
must discuss any "reasonable and prudent alternatives that the
Service believes will avoid the adverse consequence. "24
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1).
18. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1159.
19. See supra notes 3 and 4 for the criteria used to determine if a particular
animal is "endangered" or "threatened".
20. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1159. (The term "critical habitat" is defined as the
specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the species , at the time it
is listed... [as threatened or endangered] on which are found those physical or
biological features essential to the conservation of the species and which may
require special management considerations or protection. Specific areas outside
the geographic area occupied by the species can also qualify is the Secretary
determines that such areas are essential to the conservation of the species. 16
U.S.C. § 1532(5)).
21. Id. (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.14).
22. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A)).
23. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)).
24. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A)).
[Vol. 20:173176
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B. Factual Basis and Procedural History
The Klamath Project is a series of lakes, rivers, dams and irri-
gation canals that run between northern California and southern
Oregon.25 The project is under the administration of the Bureau
of Reclamation, and in 1992 the Bureau notified the Service that
the project might affect two species of fish that were on the endan-
gered species list.26 After researching the project, the Service
determined that the long-term operation of the project was likely
to jeopardize the existence of the two endangered species of fish.
The Service recommended several measures that it believed would
avoid the jeopardy to the species, which included the maintenance
of minimum water levels on two of the reservoirs that were
included in the project.28 Pursuant to this recommendation, the
Bureau decided to comply with the Service's Biological Opinion.29
The petitioners claim that there is a complete lack of any com-
mercial or scientific evidence indicating that the continued opera-
tion of the project will have any adverse effect on the named
species or that the compliance with the Biological Opinion will
have any beneficial effect on the populations of these same spe-
cies.30 The petitioners claim a competing interest in the very
water that the Biological Opinion claims is vital to the preserva-
tion of the endangered fish. The district court dismissed the
action because the petitioners' interests were outside of the "zone
of interests"31 that were meant to be protected by the ESA and
thus they lacked standing.32 The court of appeals affirmed, saying
that the petitioners were outside the class of people that could
obtain relief either under the ESA or the APA and that only those
that allege an interest in the preservation of endangered species
could maintain a suit under these provisions.33 After granting
certiorari, the Supreme Court addressed two questions: (1)
25. Id.
26. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1159.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1159 - 1161.
31. The "zone of interests" formulation tests "whether the interest sought to
be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interest to be
protected by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Association of
Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
32. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1160.
33. Id. (The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) authorizes a court to "set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary,
1997]
5
Evans: Bennett v. Spear: A New Interpretation of the Citizen-Suit Provis
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1997
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
whether the "zone of interests" test applies to claims brought
under the citizen-suit provision of the ESA; and (2) if so, whether
the petitioners have standing notwithstanding the fact that they
seek to advance economic rather than environmental interests. 4
Petitioners' complaint raised three claims that are relevant to
this Note. The first two claims alleged the Service's determina-
tions and the resulting minimum water level imposition violated
section 7 of the ESA.35 The third claim alleged that section 4 of
the ESA was violated because it failed to take into account the
designation's economic impact.36 The petitioners contended that
their claims could be brought under both the ESA and the APA,
but the ESA would be more beneficial to the petitioners because it
allowed them to recover litigation costs when the court deemed it
appropriate 37 and because the APA only allows recovery when
"there is no other adequate remedy in a court."
38
C. Standing
For the preceding reasons, the Court addressed the ESA
claims first.39 The court determined that in order for the petition-
ers to have standing to seek judicial review they must meet the
Article III "case" and "controversy" requirements as well as the
judicially self-imposed requirement of the "zone of interests"
test.40 The court points out that the breadth of the zone of inter-
ests test varies depending on the provisions of law at issue.4 1 For
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Id.
at 1167 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994))).
34. Id,
35. Id. (The petitioners alleged a violation of the following provision, in
pertinent part, "Each Federal Agency shall, ... In fulfilling the requirements of
this paragraph each agency shall use the best scientific and commercial data
available." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)).
36. Id. ("The Secretary shall designate critical habitat, and make revisions
thereto, under subsection (a)(3) of this section on the basis of the best scientific
data available and after taking into consideration the economic impact, and other
relevant impact, of specifying any particular area as critical habitat (emphasis
added)." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2)).
37. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4)).
38. Id. at 1161 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704).
39. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1161.
40. Id. (Article III refers to the Article III of the United States Constitution.
For an in depth discussion of the "zone of interests" test see Stanford A. Church,
Note, A Defense of the "Zone of Interests" Standing Test, 1983 DuKE L.J. 447
(1983)).
41. Id.
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example, obtaining judicial review of administrative action under
the "generous review provisions" of the APA would be easier than
obtaining review under many other statutes when using the same
zone of interests test.42 The zone of interests test applies unless
expressly negated.43 The language of the ESA citizen-suit provi-
sion" is extremely broad when compared with other language
that Congress normally uses.4 5 In fact, the Court held that the
term "any person" should be construed not only to include environ-
mentalists, but also those asserting overenforcement of the ESA.
There are several reasons to for such an expansive reading of
the term "any person." First, the overall subject matter of the
ESA is the environment, "a matter in which it is common to think
all persons have an interest."46 Secondly, the Court reasoned that
Congress intended this Act to be enforced by so called "private
attorneys general" as evidenced by the elimination of the amount
in controversy and the diversity of citizenship requirements as
well as the addition of a provision for the recovery of litigation
costs.4 7 The Court then noted that standing can be expanded
beyond the particular applicable test as evidenced by its decision
42. Id. (citing Clarke v. Securities Indus. Assn., 479 U.S. 388, 400, n.16
(1987)).
43. Id. at 1162. See also Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340,
345-348 (1984).
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) in pertinent part, states as follows:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection any person may
commence civil suit on his own behalf -
(A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other
governmental instrumentality or agency (to the extent permitted by the
eleventh amendment to the Constitution), who is alleged to be in
violation of any provision of this chapter or regulation issued under the
authority thereof; or ... (C) against the Secretary where there is a
failure of the Secretary to perform any act or duty under section 1533 of
this title which is not discretionary with the Secretary. The district
courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in
controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce any such
provision or regulation, or to order the Secretary to perform such act or
duty, as the case may be...
(4) The court, in issuing any final order in any suit brought pursuant to
paragraph (1) of this subsection, may award costs of litigation (including
reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whatever the court
determines such award is appropriate. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (emphasis added).
45. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1162.
46. Id.
47. Id.
1997] 179
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in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,4" which held that
standing was expanded to the full extent permitted under Article
III by a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 that had similar
"any person" language.4 9 The Bennett Court then held as follows:
It is true that the plaintiffs here are seeking to prevent application
of environmental restrictions rather than implement them. But
the 'any person' formulation applies to all the causes of action
authorized by section 1540(g) ... not only to actions against the
Secretary asserting underenforcement under section 1533, but
also to actions against the Secretary asserting overenforcement
under section 1533.50
D. Further Analysis
The Government also advanced several alternative grounds
by which the Court could uphold the dismissal of the petitioners'
suit.51 Although the district and appellate courts found the zone
of interests test to be dispositive, because the other issues were
fully briefed and argued before the Court, the Court exercised its
discretion to consider them rather than remand them for disposi-
tion at a lower level.52 The first contention was that the complaint
failed to satisfy the standing requirements imposed by Article
III.5 3 Next the respondents argued that the petitioners were not
entitled to judicial review under the ESA's citizen-suit provision
under "subsection (A) because the Secretary is not 'in violation' of
the ESA, and under subsection (C) because the Secretary had not
failed to perform any nondiscretionary duty under section 1533."54
48. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
49. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1162-1163 (The Civil Rights Act, which was at issue
in the Trafficante case allows "any person" who has been injured by a
discriminatory housing practice to bring suit for violation of the Act. This very
same "any person" language is used in the ESA which allows "any person" to
commence a civil suit to enjoin any person from violating the Act.).
50. Id. at 1163 (The term "Secretary" as it is used in the context of the ESA
means the Secretary of Interior or the Secretary of Commerce as program
responsibilities are vested pursuant to the provisions of the Reorganization Plan
Numbered 4 of 1970. .. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (1994).).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1163-1165 (The Court, however, found that the petitioners had
adequately met the Article III standing requirements. This determination will
not be further discussed as it is not relevant to the scope of this Note.).
54. Id. at 1165. See supra note 42 for the text of the relevant portions of the
ESA citizen-suit provision.
180 [Vol. 20:173
8
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol20/iss1/6
BENNETT v. SPEAR
The Court held that the petitioners claims under Section
1533(b)(2)5" were reviewable because the government failed to
"take into consideration the economic impact and other relevant
impact" and failed to use "the best scientific data available" as this
was not a discretionary duty of the Secretary.56 The Court also
determined section 1540(g)(1) limited recovery to violations of sec-
tion 1533; therefore recovery could not be had for violations of sec-
tion 1536 under any provision of the ESA alleged in the
complaint.5" To complete its analysis, the Court had to determine
if petitioners' section 1536 claims could be brought under the
APA.5 8
The APA provides for judicial review of all "final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court,"
and applies universally "except to the extent that-(1) statutes
preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law."5 9 The Court found no indication that
the ESA citizen-suit provision in anyway precluded the applica-
tion of the APA.60
To determine the zone of interest standing requirement under
the APA one must look to the substantive provisions of the legisla-
tion in question, here the ESA, and the complaint that gave rise to
the action.6 1 "Whether the plaintiffs interest is 'arguably. . . pro-
tected ... by the statute' within the meaning of the zone-of-inter-
ests test is to be determined not by reference to the overall
purpose of the Act in question (here species preservation), but by
reference to the particular provision of law upon which the plain-
tiff relies."62 Thus, the Court held that the lower courts' determi-
55. See supra note 36 for the text of this section.
56. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1165-66 (Under Subsection (C) of 16 U.S.C.
1540(g)(1), recovery can only be had where the Secretary has failed to perform a
duty under section 1533 which is not discretionary with the Secretary. The
Court determined that the "shall" language used in section 1533(b)(2) made such
duties an obligation, rather that discretionary.).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1167.
59. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a) and 704 (1994)).
60. Id.
61. Id. (The APA is simply a statute that gives plaintiffs standing to challenge
the violation of other substantive statutes such as the ESA; therefore you must
look to the underlying statute to see if the interest sought to be protected by the
complainant is within the zone of interests to be protected by that statute.).
62. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1167 (The Court goes on to quote one of its earlier
decisions on that same proposition: "the plaintiff must establish that the injury
he complains of ... falls within the 'zone-of interests' sought to be protected by
1997]
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nation that the petitioners failed to meet this standing
requirement (because petitioners were not seeking to vindicate
the preservation of species) was in error because the lower courts
applied the zone of interests test incorrectly. 63
Finally, the respondents argued that the "Biological Opinion"
did not constitute final agency action.64 Two conditions must be
met for agency action to be final: "[F]irst, the action must mark
the 'consummation' of the agency's decision making process,6 ...
it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And
second, the action must be one by which 'rights or obligations have
been determined,' or from which 'legal consequences will flow.' ' 6
The Court determined that both of these requirements were met
and that petitioners had standing to seek recovery under the
APA.6 7
III. WETLANDS AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT
Much like the Endangered Species Act that was at issue in
Bennett, there are many other legislative acts that have been
adopted to help protect and preserve the environment. One such
legislative act is the Federal Water Control Act Amendments
passed in 1972 by Congress.68 This legislation is now generally
known as the Clean Water Act (CWA). The CWA was enacted in
order "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biologi-
cal integrity of the Nation's Waters."69 In order to achieve this
goal, the CWA prohibits the discharge of any pollutants, including
dredged or fill material into navigable waters, except in accord-
ance with the Act. 70 By prohibiting the discharge of any pollu-
the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint."
(quoting Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n., 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990))).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1168 (citing Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948)).
66. Id. (citing Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget
Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970)).
67. Id. at 1168-69 (The first requirement was uncontested and the second
requirement was met because the Biological Opinion and the Incidental Take
Statement legally altered the authority of the agency by giving them the
authority to "take" the endangered species.).
68. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1994)). (The act was originally enacted in 1948 and has since been
amended several times.).
69. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
70. § 1311(a).
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tants into certain areas the Act serves to protect one of the most
valuable natural resources that we have, wetlands.
Wetlands are "those areas that are inundated or saturated by
surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to
support, and under normal conditions do support, a prevalence of
vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions.
Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar
areas."71 Wetlands are located between upland areas and deep
water areas, such as oceans, bays, rivers and lakes.7 2
Wetlands serve a number of different functions. They recycle
pollutants, purify water by holding nutrients, provide flood and
storm protection to upland areas by blocking storms and serving
as rainwater runoffs. 73 They also provide vital food resources and
habitat for wildlife and fish.7"
Congress expressed at the time of the 1977 amendments to
the CWA75 :
The wetlands and bays, estuaries and deltas are the Nations most
biologically active areas. They represent a principal source of food
supply. They are the spawning grounds for much of the fish and
shellfish which populate the oceans, and they are passages for
numerous upland game fish. They are also nesting areas for a
myriad of species of birds and wildlife. The unregulated destruc-
tion of these areas is a matter which needs to be corrected and
which implementation of section 404 has attempted to achieve.76
Section 404 of the CWA authorizes the Secretary of the Army,
acting through the Corps, to issue permits for the discharge of
dredged or fill material at specified locations. 77 These permit deci-
sions are made on the basis of guidelines developed by the Admin-
istrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)78 and the
71. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (1987).
72. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hanson, 623 F. Supp. 1539, 1543 (E.D.N.C.
1985), affd in part, vacated in part, 859 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1988).
73. Id. (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 134-
135 (1985). See also Phillip M. Bender, Slowing the Net Loss of Wetlands: Citizen-
Suit Enforcement of Clean Water Act § 404 Permit Violations, 27 ENVTL. L. 245,
251 (Wetlands serve many valuable functions for people of the United States.).
74. Id.
75. Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
76. National Wildlife Fed'n, 623 F. Supp. at 1543 (quoting 1977 U.S. C.C.A.N.
4326, 4336).
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
78. 40 C.F.R. § 230.
1997] 183
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Corps. 79 The initial decision of whether or not to issue a section
404 permit is made by the Corps, but the Administer of the EPA
has been granted the authority to prohibit, deny, or restrict a
Corps-issued permit for a particular site.80
Enforcement of the CWA is shared between the Corps and the
EPA. The Corps has the authority to contact violators and can
then determine whether legal action needs to be taken."' Simi-
larly the EPA can issue compliance orders, commence enforce-
ment actions, and levy administrative penalties.8 2 The CWA also
has a third method of enforcement. A citizen-suit provision was
included as part of the enforcement mechanism of the act.8 3
IV. HISTORY OF THE CITIZEN SUIT
The "citizen-suit" concept was born in the Clean Air Act.8 4
The citizen suit met great resistance when it was first proposed as
a part of the Clean Air Act. 5 Because of the strong interest and
feelings about environmental legislation in the late 60's and early
70's it became politically impossible to oppose the citizen suit.8 6
The proponents of the provision eventually won out on the argu-
ment that it was an essential tool by which to remedy the ever
increasing problem of the enforcing agencies' inability to control
the huge number of violations of the environmental legislation. 7
It has since been included in almost all environmental legislation
enacted after the Clean Air Act.8 As one commentator put it, "cit-
79. 33 C.F.R. § 320.
80. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (The EPA can modify the Corps permit decision if the
proposed discharge will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water
supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding
areas), wildlife, or recreational areas.).
81. 33 C.F.R. § 326.3(c).
82. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(a)-(b), 1319(g) (1994).
83. 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
84. Pub. L. No. 91-604 § 12(a), 84 Stat. 1706 (1970) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 7604 (1994)).
85. Sharon Elliot, Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act: Waiting for Godot
in the Fifth Circuit, 62 TUL. L. REV. 175 (1987) (citing Jeffrey G. Miller, Private
Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws, 13 ENVTL. L. Rep. 10309 (1983)).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994); Endangered Species Act § 11(g), 16
U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 7002, 42
U.S.C. § 6972 (1994); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1994);
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act § 520, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (1994);
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izen enforcement was to be a major balance wheel in the complex
new regulatory machinery."8 9
Citizen suits have several characteristics that make them
such an important part of ensuring that environmental statutes
are complied with. Because they are funded by the citizen or
group that brings them,90 they are free from the budgetary con-
straints that can bind governmental enforcement of environmen-
tal policy violations. 91 In addition to the monetary constraints,
governmental agencies are for the most part, because of the com-
plexity of their policies, very slow when it comes to enforcement.92
Citizen suits help to remedy this by allowing swift attack by those
unencumbered citizens who have an interest in stopping violators
from continuing their violative behavior.93 Over the years, citi-
zen-suit provisions have become a very useful and productive
enforcement mechanism. 94 Without citizen-suit provisions many
violators would go unpunished because they could be fairly
assured that the governmental enforcement mechanisms probably
would not find the violation and even if they did, they would not
have the resources to force the discontinuance of the violation.
This is true because, many times, even when the violations are
brought to the attention of the appropriate governmental agency,
that agency fails to investigate and subsequently punish the viola-
tor because of the above mentioned limited resources of these
agencies.95 Due to the above mentioned factors, citizen suits are
an essential element of the enforcement scheme of most environ-
mental legislation. 96
V. THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S CITIZEN-SUIT PROVISION
In light of the successes of citizen-suit provisions in other
environmental legislation, the Clean Water Act included such a
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act § 326, 42 U.S.C.
§ 11046 (1994); Noise Control Act, § 12, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1988); OCSLA, 43
U.S.C. § 1349(a) (1994); Bender, see supra note 73, at 245, n.113.
89. Bender, supra note 73, at 264 (citing Miller, supra note 85).
90. Most citizen-suit provisions contain a mechanism whereby the successful
party can recoup litigation costs including attorneys fees from the offending
party at the judges discretion.
91. Bender, supra note 73.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 265-266.
96. Id. at 266.
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provision in order to aid in enforcement of the Act. Section 1365 of
Title 33 of the United States Code states:
any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf-(1)
against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent per-
mitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution) who is
alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation
under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator a
State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or (2) against
the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Adminis-
trator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not
discretionary with the Administrator.97
Citizen is defined as "a person or persons having an interest
which is or may be adversely affected."9 s
The Court in Bennett commented on the tremendous breadth
of language from the ESA that is very similar to the language
expressed above. The CWA language is slightly more limiting
than the ESA language in that it requires the plaintiff to have an
interest which is adversely effected. In actuality this distinction is
of no consequence because in order to maintain a suit, the plaintiff
must meet the Article III Constitutional standing requirements in
addition to falling within the statutory limits. This is evidenced
by the Bennett Court's discussion of Article III standing require-
ments in addition to the judicially determined "zone of interests"
test that it applied.99 The Article III "case" and "controversy"
requirements require the plaintiff to have "injury in fact" in order
to maintain an action;100 therefore, a potential plaintiff would not
have any different standing requirements simply based on the
language difference in the CWA and the ESA.
The CWA citizen-suit provision also contains notice, 10 1
venue,1 0 2 and recovery-of-litigation-costs 0 3 provisions that are
similar to those found in the ESA. The CWA recovery of litigation
cost provision varies slightly from that of the ESA in that the CWA
only allows for recovery of costs to "any prevailing or substantially
prevailing party" whereas this limitation is not found in the
97. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
98. § 1365(g).
99. Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
100. Id.
101. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b).
102. § 1365(c).
103. § 1365(d).
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ESA.10 4 The jurisdictional clauses contained in both acts are simi-
lar in that they both eliminate the normal amount in controversy
or diversity of citizenship requirements that are usually required
to get into the federal court system.
1 0 5
The CWA citizen-suit provision seems to give a similar class of
plaintiffs the power to enforce the Act as does the ESA citizen-suit
provision. In light of the similar nature of the key clauses con-
tained in the citizen-suit provisions in both the ESA and the CWA,
it appears that a plaintiff will be able to maintain an action seek-
ing not only to protect the environment, but also when seeking to
prevent the overprotection of the environment. If this interpreta-
tion of the provisions is correct, what practical effect will this have
on the CWA's ability to successfully continue to accomplish its
purpose of "restoring and maintaining the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation's waters"?
10 6
As the above discussion indicates, wetlands are a key compo-
nent in maintaining the high water quality that the CWA was
enacted to ensure. How will the Court's interpretation of the ESA
citizen-suit provision in Bennett, affect the preservation of wet-
lands across our country? Only time will adequately answer this
question. 107
One possible consequence involves the denial of section 1344
permits (permit to fill wetlands). Individuals who wish to chal-
lenge the denials have been forced to do so under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act l0 8 because the citizen-suit provision of the
CWA does not expressly grant the right to judicial review based on
a section 1344 violation. Nowhere in the provision is section 1344
mentioned when other sections of the Act are expressly included.
Under the definition of "effluent standard," the CWA citizen-suit
104. § 1365(d).
105. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a); 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g).
106. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
107. Given the widespread use of the citizen-suit provision in some seventeen
environmental legislative acts, it is obviously beyond the scope of this Note to
explore all the possible ramifications that the decision in Bennett could have on
environmental legislation in general. In fact, the Clean Water Act itself is too
broad in and of itself to be fully explored in this Note. This Note is only
attempting to point out the great effect that the Bennett Court's interpretation of
the citizen-suit provision could have and to give a few examples of how the same
provision could specifically affect wetlands through the section 404 permitting
process. Dredge and fill permits, which are commonly called section 404 permits,
are governed by the legislation that is codified today in 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
108. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
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provision expressly gives plaintiffs wishing to bring suit for the
violation of sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1341, 1342, 1323, and
1345 the right to do so. 10 9 It has been argued that a citizen suit
action should be able to be brought for a violation of section 1344
because of the overall intent of the act to protect the environ-
ment. 110 Nevertheless, a citizen suit has, to date, not been suc-
cessfully maintained by a plaintiff attempting to enforce violations
of section 1344.
Even though a citizen suit to enforce section 1344 violations is
not expressly authorized, there is another angle that a potential
plaintiff could argue. As previously discussed, the decisions to
grant or deny a particular application for a dredge and fill permit
(section 1344) are made on the basis of guidelines that are deline-
ated in 40 C.F.R. § 230 and 33 C.F.R. § 320. Section 320.4
describes the general policies for evaluating permit applications
and it begins as follows, "[tihe following policies shall be applica-
ble to the review of all applications.""' Under the Public Interest
review this section says:
[t]he benefits which reasonably may be expected to accrue from
the proposal must be balanced against its reasonable foreseeable
detriments .... All factors which may be relevant to the proposal
must be considered including the cumulative effects thereof:
among those are conservation, economics, aesthetics .... and, in
general, the needs and welfare of the people. 112
Now, keep in mind that the CWA citizen-suit provision autho-
rizes suit against the Administrator where the Administrator fails
to perform any nondiscretionary duty.113 The Court in Bennett
held that "shall" was language that indicated an obligation rather
than discretion." 4 Given that the language of section 320.4 pro-
vides that the policies "shall" be applicable and then delineates
that "all" relevant factors must be taken into consideration includ-
ing "economics" and the "needs and welfare of the people," depend-
ing on the fact pattern, a potential plaintiff could make a case
under the CWA citizen-suit provision claiming that the Adminis-
trator failed to take into account his economic interests in denying
109. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f).
110. For a full discussion of why citizen suits should be allowed to enforce
§ 1344, see Bender, supra note 73.
111. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4 (1997).
112. Id.
113. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1994).
114. Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1165-66.
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the issuance of a 404 permit. The hypothetical situation described
above is similar to the scenario in Bennett, a case in which the
plaintiff successfully obtained judicial review under the citizen-
suit provision of the ESA.
The specifics of the above example are really not all that sig-
nificant. What is important is the fact that the Bennett decision
opens the door to a type of suit that potential plaintiffs can bring
that will effectively reduce the efficiency by which the EPA and
the Corps will be able to regulate the issuance of section 404 per-
mits. As discussed above, the resources of these governmental
agencies are limited.1 1 5 As a result, they are already, without the
added burden of defending these types of suits, forced to pick and
choose which enforcement battles they are able to fight. It was
also discussed above that the very reason that citizen-suit provi-
sions were implemented was to aid the governmental agencies in
the enforcement of violations of these environmental acts. The
purpose of implementing these citizen-suit provisions was to fur-
ther the overall goal of the legislative acts themselves: the protec-
tion and preservation of the environment."
6
VI. SOLUTION
The decision of the Bennett Court is legally sound. The Court
relies on a long line of judicial precedent and a well reasoned
scheme of statutory interpretation that has been used to interpret
legislation of all types. When interpreting a statute to see if the
plaintiff asserts an interest that is within the "zone of interests"
test, the proper analysis focuses not on the overall purpose of the
Act, but rather the purpose of the particular provision upon which
the plaintiff relies." '
It appears that the solution does not lie with the judiciary, but
rather with the legislature. If the legislature is dissatisfied with
the effect that this decision has on the overall purpose of the envi-
ronmental acts that contain these citizen-suit provisions, it can
easily amend the legislation. The amendments would not have to
create sweeping change or drastically alter how any of these acts
are carried out. In fact, a simple addition that limited the class of
115. See Bender, supra note 73, at 261 (Enforcement is a low priority partly
because of budgetary constraints.).
116. Even the Court in Bennett, recognizes that the overall purpose of the
legislation is the environment. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1162.
117. See Bennett, 117 S. Ct. at 1167 (citing Association of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)).
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people that could bring the citizen suits to those that were seeking
to further the overall purpose of the legislation would adequately
resolve the issue.
This type of amendment would not greatly restrict the rights
of those individuals that wished to challenge the effect of certain
governmental actions under the authority of any of these acts. All
final agency decisions are currently subject to judicial review
under the APA." s The proper inquiry under the APA is whether
the particular governmental agency's determination or action was
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law."11 This method of obtaining review is
widely used. 120
In addition to review under the APA, potential plaintiffs also
have all of the common law rights of action that can be brought to
obtain judicial review.' 2 ' The CWA citizen-suit provision
expressly states that nothing in the section shall restrict any stat-
utory or common law right that any person might use to seek
enforcement of any limitation or standard imposed by the Act.'22
A party that seeks judicial review of an agency action that is
precluded from receiving such review based on the citizen-suit
provision in the applicable act, does have other options. It is, how-
ever, important to remove the citizen suit as an additional tool
that can be used to thwart the very purpose for which these envi-
ronmental legislative acts were enacted. This tool does not need
to be available, among other reasons, because it not only removes
the usual amount in controversy and diversity requirements nec-
essary to get into federal court, it also provides for the recovery of
litigation costs.
118. 80 Stat. 392 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706).
119. § 706(2)(A).
120. See Child v. United States, 851 F. Supp. 1527, 1534 (D. Utah 1994) (APA
used to review final agency action); see also Bersani, v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency, 674 F. Supp. 405, 412 (N.D.N.Y 1987); See
also Town of Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 968 F.2d 1438,
1445 (D. Mass 1992); See also Bailey v. United States, 647 F. Supp. 44, 46 (D.
Idaho 1986); There are countless other cases where the APA was used in order to
gain judicial review of an agency determination.
121. These rights are of course subject to the limitations of the Eleventh
Amendment and the concept of governmental sovereign immunity.
122. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e).
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VII. CONCLUSION
"There can be no doubt today that every effort must be made
individually and collectively to protect our natural heritage, and
to pass it to future generations unspoiled. The destruction of
ancient civilizations by human misuse of the environment, such as
that at Ephesus, teaches the need for public policies that work
within the natural environment, rather than attempt radically to
alter it." 12 3 There is no doubt our wetlands are a very valuable
resource that we, as a society, need to make every effort to protect.
Wetlands are part of a much larger picture; therefore, when they
are filled to build houses, malls, etc. in the "pursuit of progress,"
we actually digress.
The Bennett Court's holding that a citizen suit can be main-
tained not only by a plaintiff seeking relief as a result of the
underprotection of the environment, but also for the overprotec-
tion of the environment, is not by itself going to lead to the
destruction of the environment. However, this decision does give
developers, homebuilders, etc. more leverage which they can exert
in order to build that new structure, or divert the course of that
stream and in so doing put that much more pressure on the envi-
ronment. There is no doubt that as our population grows, sacri-
fices will have to be made; but, we must strive to reach some kind
of balance whereby we can meet our needs without depleting and
destroying the environment in which we live.
Lynwood P. Evans
123. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1175 (D.N.J. 1994)
(citing Rick Kelly, Have We Learned Anything from Ephesus? 49 IowA
CONSERVATIONISTS #4, April 1990, at 7).
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